Helena Marten
News Editor
On Wednesday, Feb. 25, Chelsea Bowden, assistant professor of philosophy at Denison University, gave a talk for the Phi Sigma Tau Honor Society event in Lean Lecture Hall. In 2024, Bowden published a paper titled “Inquiry, Value, and Some Peculiarities of the Pyrrhonist’s Psychology.” Throughout the talk, Bowden discussed her understanding of Pyrrhonist preferences and their influence on moral action.
Pyrrhonian Skepticism is an ancient school of philosophical thought. The Skeptic is seen as holding no inherent beliefs or values but is instead guided by the desire to curate a state of tranquility in steep contrast with the Dogmatist. Bowden argued that the Skeptic can perform morally good actions and “that there’s good reason to think the Skeptic is more likely to act morally, in some sociopolitical context, than her Dogmatic peers, whether these be philosophical Dogmatists or ordinary people.” The Skeptic does not hold any personal moral beliefs but “nevertheless has the resources to act morally, namely, [through] preferences and desires,” said Bowden, which will cause the Skeptic to question everything, including facing immoral systems rather than conforming.
Many arguing against the morality of the Skeptic argue that they will conform to a strong will since they have no absolute moral value. Bowden countered that the Skeptic’s “stable preferences and desires, all argue, are likely to motivate her and orient her away from problematic conformism and towards performing morally good actions in sociopolitical contexts.” Bowden stated that “the first feature of the Skeptic is that she is … an inquirer after the truth,” and this makes the Skeptic more likely to make a morally good decision because they are in a constant genuine search for verity. In contrast, Bowden highlighted that Dogmatists have given up the search for the truth by resigning their beliefs. “Thus, the Skeptic begins by investigating some issue where the appearances seem to be in conflict. They then, in an effort to resolve this conflict, muster arguments on both sides of this issue through what is known as the skeptical modes,” said Bowden.
The Skeptic is able to see a conflict, process the appearances and thoughts of each side and suspend judgment. The result is a lack of emotional distress, as it is in their nature to choose a state of tranquility. “For the person who believes that something is good, or bad, by nature is constantly upset. … So the Skeptic, by contrast, is less troubled, for although she can’t help but be somewhat distressed by various unpleasant states of affairs that arise in life, she doesn’t suffer from additional beliefs about these states of affairs being really good or bad by nature,” said Bowden.
The opposing argument is that the Skeptic is detached and lacks the necessary resources to act morally and be motivated to make consistent moral decisions. Though, as identified by Bowden, the constant desire for truth will motivate the Skeptic to act morally as well as her individual preferences. The Skeptic can make moral decisions without belief because their internal desires will allow them to make stable decisions just as a moral agent with beliefs does. “If one says that a system is a way of life, that, in accordance with appearances, follows a certain rationale, where the rationale shows how it’s possible to seem to live rightly, rightly being taken not only as referring to virtue, but in a more ordinary sense, and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment,” said Bowden.
The Skeptic acts in accordance and is motivated “with [their] own particular pathé” and therefore has the ability to act morally, said Bowden. A pathé refers to passively received, internal preferences and desires. In her closing argument, Bowden made the claim that action does not require belief about what is good and bad, instead focusing on the actions of the Skeptic instead of the belief of the Stoic. There is a counterargument that the Skeptic has no reason to have the right kinds of stable preferences and beliefs and that they only care about tranquility. Bowden responded that the Skeptic will have an openness and promote a society that allows them to exist and to freely join and exit said society, rather than conform.
Bowden gave an example of how a Skeptic would handle a tyrant kidnapping the Skeptic and her father. In this example the tyrant orders the Skeptic to eat and kill her own father. Some arguments allege that the Skeptic will oblige as they have no strong beliefs. Bowden used this example to argue that the Skeptic could have a desire to keep their father around as they enjoy his company and will therefore not kill their own father. This is a facingly moral action motivated by the preference and desire of the Skeptic, showing that the Skeptic is capable of moral action without holding beliefs.